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THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT:  
GRISWOLD, PRIVACY, AND AT-HOME 
REPRODUCTIVE CARE 
Yvonne Lindgren* 
INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law has traditionally offered greater protection to 
activities exercised within the home. This is true in common law 
as well as across a broad range of constitutional claims. For 
example, common law privacy protection identifies the home as a 
location of solitude and repose and is often conceptualized as the 
“right to be let alone.”1 Fourth Amendment protections against 
search and seizure and the notion of the reasonable expectation 
of privacy are enhanced when the defendant is within her or his 
home.2 In contrast to other constitutional claims, however, I argue 
in this Article that reproductive self-care—care that takes place 
outside of the formal healthcare setting—receives less 
constitutional protection when exercised in the privacy of the 
home.3 Most frequently, restrictions on reproductive self-care in 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law 
(2017-2018). J.S.D, LL.M., U.C. Berkeley School of Law; J.D., Hastings College of Law; 
B.A., U.C.L.A. I would like to thank the participants in the AALS Annual Meeting in San 
Francisco; the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Health Law Professors 
Conference at Saint Louis University Law School; the U.S. Feminist Judgements Project: 
Re-Writing the Law, Writing the Future at University of Akron School of Law; the Loyola 
University of Chicago School of Law Seventh Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium; the 
Seventh Annual Midwest Law and Society Retreat at University of Madison, Wisconsin; 
and the Indiana Tech Law School Faculty Scholarship Workshop; as well as Jamie Abrams, 
Jill Hasday, Sharona Hoffman, Farah Diaz-Tello, Maya Manian, Melissa Mikesell, and 
Barbara Noah for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thank you also 
to the Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice at Berkeley Law and the Self-Induction 
Abortion Legal Team for providing invaluable information, resources, and webinar 
presentations on medication abortion and its legal implications. 
 1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 195 (1890) (arguing for the recognition in law of the right of privacy which they 
described as the “right to be let alone”).  
 2. See infra at notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
 3. I use the term “home” because the home is where medication abortion is most 
frequently ingested. See Mitchell D. Creinin & Kristina Gemzell Danielsson, Medical 
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the home take the form of what I have termed a “doctor 
requirement”: laws that require reproductive care be performed 
in a formal healthcare setting, often requiring that a doctor be 
physically present. While the doctor requirement is imposed in a 
variety of reproductive self-care contexts—including self-
insemination,4 miscarriage management,5 abortion, and home 
birth6—this Article will focus specifically on medication abortion.7 
 
Abortion in Early Pregnancy, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED AND ABNORMAL 
PREGNANCY: COMPREHENSIVE ABORTION CARE 114 (Paul et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY]; Medical Management of First-Trimester 
Abortion, 143 AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS PRACTICE BULLETIN: 
CLINICAL MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR OBSTETRICIAN-GYNECOLOGISTS 3 (Mar. 
2014) [hereinafter ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN]. However, the critical aspect of the 
doctor requirement is that pregnant people are forced into public healthcare settings, and 
thereby necessarily out of private spaces of their choosing, whether it be the home or any 
other non-clinical setting. For a discussion of how the Court has extended the reach of 
zonal privacy beyond the home to include areas possessing the qualities of home, such as 
an office, store, hotel room, automobile, or taxicab, see Yvonne Lindgren, Personal 
Autonomy: Towards a New Taxonomy of Privacy Law, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 447, 454 
n.31 (2010). I use the term home while acknowledging that pregnant people may choose 
other non-clinical settings to ingest medication abortion.  
 4. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act required a doctor’s supervision as a 
condition for releasing a sperm donor from the rights and obligations of paternity. While 
the doctor requirement was removed from the UPA in 2002, many states retain the doctor 
requirement in their statutory schemes. See, e.g., Kansas Parentage Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23-2208(f) (2014); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 538–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(granting visitation over the mother’s objection based upon a conclusion that a sperm 
donor’s paternity rights are invalidated only if the insemination is conducted “under the 
supervision of a licensed physician” under state law); MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN 
LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 388 (2015).  
 5. Several states have recently introduced legislation requiring that all miscarriages 
be registered with a healthcare professional. See e.g., Ohio Sub. S.B. 175, 127th General 
Assembly (Dec. 2015) (requiring women who suffer a miscarriage to file a form with the 
state of Ohio indicating that they suffered a miscarriage and providing for felony charges 
punishable with life in prison or death for any “prenatal murder,” including those in which 
there was “human involvement”); S.B. 962–098385288, (Va. 2009) (requiring all pregnant 
people in Virginia to report miscarriages to police or risk legal penalties, including as much 
as a year in jail). 
 6. See, e.g., Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: 
Recognizing Mothers-to-Be as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L.J. 849, 
874 (2005) (discussing the ways that privacy of the home is implicated by midwifery in the 
home-birth context); Jennifer J. Tachera, A “Birth Right”: Home Births, Midwives and the 
Right to Privacy, 12 PAC. L.J. 97, 103 (1980) (arguing that home birth is an aspect of the 
privacy right because it relates to family relationships); Barbara A. McCormick, Note, 
Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman’s Right To Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 
694–95 (1983) (arguing that the constitutional right of privacy protects a woman’s right to 
choose the site and method of delivery).  
 7. Medication abortion involves the use of medication rather than surgery to induce 
an abortion. See, e.g., ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 1. 
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It considers a previously unaddressed question:8 Why is the home 
treated differently in cases of abortion-related self-care than in 
other constitutional moments and what does that difference 
reveal about this type of regulation? I conclude that laws imposing 
a doctor requirement are unconstitutional because medication 
abortion at home falls within privacy law’s traditional protection 
of spatial, relational, and decisional privacy.9 I conclude that the 
doctor requirement reveals that rather than a realm of privacy, 
the home has become a site of increasing regulation of pregnant 
people’s reproductive autonomy in the guise of benign medical 
protectionism. 
The anomalous treatment in law of reproductive self-care at 
home, when compared with the law’s treatment of other types of 
constitutional and common law privacy claims, offers a rich 
opportunity to consider how claims of reproductive autonomy, 
safeguarding the health of pregnant persons,10 and the privacy of 
the home coalesce in reproductive self-care to reveal underlying 
tensions in regulation in this area. I argue that medication 
abortion in the home falls squarely within the protections of 
privacy jurisprudence: First, in medication abortion the home 
functions in its traditional privacy role as a zone free from third-
party intrusion and governmental surveillance for pregnant 
people accessing medication abortion. For example, medication 
 
 8. Previous scholarship has considered reproductive self-care primarily in the 
context of home-birth, with an emerging scholarship addressing the constitutional 
implications of self-abortion. See, e.g., Suzanne M. Alford, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental 
Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1029 (2003); Cohen, supra note 6; Stacey Tovino, American 
Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative References for Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 
11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61 (2004); McCormick, supra note 6. 
 9. These categories are used in Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1443 (1992). However, many scholars have used taxonomy to 
classify the complex subject of privacy law. See, e.g., JUDITH W. DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF 
PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75–77 (1997) (identifying 
privacy as a cluster of rights relating to informational privacy, accessibility privacy, and 
expressive privacy); Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, 
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1976); Tom Gerety, 
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977); Jerry Kang, Information 
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (1998) (defining 
privacy to include three overlapping clusters of rights: physical space, choice, and flow of 
personal information); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 
489 (2006).  
 10. I use the term pregnant “people” instead of “women” to acknowledge that trans 
men and other gender-non-conforming people may also seek abortion-related healthcare 
and may have even more difficulty accessing reproductive healthcare than cis-women 
seeking abortion. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Who Has Abortions?, NATION (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/who-has-abortions/.  
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abortion at home protects pregnant people in violent intimate 
relationships from surveillance and further violence from intimate 
partners that can be triggered by pregnancy; the home protects 
individuals from harassment and surveillance by anti-abortion 
protesters at clinics; and the home protects those with 
compromised immigration status from state surveillance at 
immigration checkpoints along the southern border of the United 
States when travelling long distances to access abortion-related 
healthcare at clinics. Second, the doctor requirement in 
medication abortion infringes on privacy as a right related to 
intimacy and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that the 
Court has recognized at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 
Finally, medication abortion at home is encompassed by privacy’s 
protection of intimate association as abortion at home allows 
pregnant people to end their own pregnancies in the privacy of 
their homes with the support of their chosen company, or alone, 
rather than in a clinical setting. I conclude that restrictions on 
reproductive self-care in the home are incongruous with privacy 
law’s traditional articulation in both common law and 
constitutional law. 
Next, I consider more generally whether privacy is an 
adequate legal framework to identify the interests involved in 
restrictions on medication abortion at home. While medication 
abortion at home falls within privacy’s framework of zonal, 
relational, and decisional privacy,12 I draw upon critical and 
feminist legal scholarship to argue that the harms imposed on 
pregnant people ending their pregnancies at home are not 
adequately captured or conceptualized by privacy's conceptual 
framework of individuals exercising rights in the privacy of the 
home. The Court’s privacy analysis that identifies the home as a 
critical zone of protection against state surveillance and intrusion 
fails to acknowledge the ways in which medication abortion at 
home implicates private violence, third party harassment and 
surveillance, and state-sponsored surveillance and regulation in 
the lives of pregnant people. What is more, the privacy analysis 
 
 11. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
 12. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1443.  
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fails to consider the ways in which state policies that deny access 
to abortion-related healthcare create the conditions under which 
pregnant people turn to medication abortion in the home, due to 
clinic closures, immigration enforcement, intimate partner 
violence, and harassment at clinics, to name only a few. This is 
especially true for pregnant people who are living in poverty,13 of 
color,14 or with compromised immigration status15 because 
pregnancies for these vulnerable groups are disproportionately 
subjected to surveillance.16 In short, the doctor requirement 
 
 13. While the rate of unintended pregnancies and abortion has declined among 
people with resources and college graduates, it has increased among people living in 
poverty and with less education. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in 
Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL 
REPROD. HEALTH 90–96 (2006); see also id. at 93 tbl. 1. As a result, those with the least 
resources bear a disproportionate burden of unintended pregnancies and abortion. Allan 
Rosenfield, Foreword, in MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at 
x. 
 14. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 18 (2d ed. 2000) (describing a 
“matrix of domination” to refer to the way intersection systems of oppression function to 
discipline the lives of marginalized and oppressed populations); see also Kimberlé W. 
Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1449 
(2012) (“The interplay between structures and identities are key elements in 
understanding the ways that [women of color] are situated within and affected by the 
various systems of social control.”). A rich body of scholarship has highlighted the 
intersection of reproductive oppression and racial control in a variety of contexts including 
forced sterilization, family caps on public support, lack of access to culturally sensitive birth 
control, and criminalizing women for negative birth and pregnancy outcomes. See, e.g., 
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE REPRODUCTION AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 250–254 (1997); SILLMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF 
COLOR ORGANIZE FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 127 (2004); Elena R. Gutiérrez, Issue 
Brief, Bringing Families Out of ‘Cap’tivity: The Need To Repeal the Calworks Maximum 
Family Grant Rule, CTR. ON REPROD. RTS. & JUST (April 2013)., https://www.law
.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/CRRJ_Issue_Brief_MFG_Rule_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 
2017); Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 
152–154 (2006). By contrast, wealthier women’s pregnancies are less likely to be subject to 
surveillance, as they rely on private physicians, midwives and home care. 
 15. See infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Brief for National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) and 
Center for Reproductive Rights and Justice at the University of California, Berkeley 
School of Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Patel v. State, No. 71A04-
1504-CR-00166 (Ind. Ct. App. filed Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Patel Amicus Brief]; see also 
KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A 
SITE OF RACIALIZATION 41–73 (2011); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE 
COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 25–46 ( 2002) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE] (discussing the 
impact of state surveillance on communities of color); Dorothy Roberts & Jeffrey Vagle, 
Opinion, Racial Surveillance Has a Long History, HILL (Jan. 4, 2016), http://thehill.
com/opinion/op-ed/264710-racial-surveillance-has-a-long-history (noting that wide-
ranging welfare surveillance disproportionately strips recipients of color’s dignity and 
privacy). 
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reveals how a myriad of political, structural, and economic forces 
work in tandem to deny the right of privacy in its traditional sense 
to pregnant people exercising reproductive self-care in the home. 
Thus, while the doctor requirement falls within privacy’s 
framework, it simultaneously reveals how insubstantial the 
privacy analysis is in articulating the interests at stake with respect 
to the right of dignity and autonomy of pregnant people seeking 
to exercise abortion-related self-care in the home. 
It is a critical time to consider doctor-requirement 
restrictions on medication abortion as these laws are gaining 
momentum. In the last four years, nineteen states have passed 
laws requiring that the two-pill regimen for medication abortion 
be taken in the presence of a doctor,17 despite guidelines by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA),18 the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO), which do not require that either of 
the pills be ingested in a doctor’s presence.19 The doctor 
requirement restricts pregnant people’s ability to engage in 
abortion-related self-care in the privacy of their homes and 
effectively prohibits the use of telemedicine for abortion care.20 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the two-
pill medication abortion regimen and its uses both within and 
outside of the clinical context. This section details state law 
restrictions on at-home use of medication abortion and their 
impact on the widespread practice of using telemedicine to deliver 
abortion-related healthcare to people living in areas without 
 
 17. Telemedicine Introductory Brief: Provision of Medication Abortion, IBIS 
REPROD. HEALTH (Jan. 2016), https://www.ibisreproductivehealth.org/sites/default/files/
files/publications/Telemedicine%20introductory%20brief%20Jan%202016.pdf. 
 18. The new FDA guidelines require that the first drug, mifepristone, be “dispensed” 
by a doctor, but does not require that the pills be ingested in the presence of a doctor. 
Because the guidelines do not require that either drug, mifepristone or misoprostol, be 
taken in the presence of a doctor, they can be taken at home. ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, 
supra note 3, at 2. 
 19. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH 
SYSTEMS 44 (2d. ed. 2012) [hereinafter SAFE ABORTION] (“Home use of misoprostol is a 
safe option for women.”); ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2. 
 20. Telemedicine is a method of providing abortion care at a distance using 
technology. The doctor requirement restricts the use of telemedicine both for home based 
and clinic based telemedicine abortion care. See infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
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access to clinics, especially rural areas.21 It considers the claims 
that these restrictions are designed to protect women’s health in 
light of the undue burden standard of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,22 and its recent articulation in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.23 Part II argues that state 
restrictions on medication abortion are unconstitutional because 
medication abortion at home falls within the purview of privacy 
law’s traditional protection of zonal, relational, and decisional 
privacy. It concludes that the privacy interest at stake in 
medication abortion at home involves matters of personal 
significance related to procreation, within the physical confines of 
the home, as well as the right to exercise control over one’s body 
that go beyond mere location of the medical procedure in a 
healthcare setting. Part III critiques the limitations of the privacy 
analysis in the context of medication abortion at home and 
considers how larger systems and structures deny access to 
privacy for pregnant people seeking to exercise reproductive self-
care in the home. 
I. THE HOME AND REPRODUCTIVE SELF-CARE 
Medication abortion involves the use of medication rather 
than surgery to induce an abortion.24 A pregnant person may end 
a pregnancy at home using medication abortion under two 
circumstances: within the clinical context facilitated by a doctor 
or outside of the clinical context by self-inducing abortion. This 
section details the ways that medication abortion is used to end 
pregnancy both inside and outside of the clinical setting. In each 
of these instances, some part of the medication abortion regimen 
occurs at home. 
A. MEDICATION ABORTION AND THE HOME 
Medication abortion is commonplace in the United States 
through medical facilities.25 In this clinical context, a pregnant 
 
 21. R.J. Gomperts et al., Using Telemedicine for Termination of Pregnancy with 
Mifepristone and Misoprostol in Settings Where There Is No Access to Safe Services, 115 
INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1171, 1173 (2008). 
 22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 23. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 24. See, e.g., ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 25. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173; see also Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, 
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 46 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 17, 17–27(2014). 
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person takes a two-drug protocol—mifepristone and 
misoprostol—approved by the FDA.26 The FDA protocol 
requires that the first medication, mifepristone, be dispensed at a 
clinic,27 but does not indicate where either of the two drugs must 
be ingested. Studies reveal that most pregnant people who end 
their pregnancies using abortion medication choose to do so at 
home.28 Medication abortion using the two-drug regimen under a 
doctor’s supervision is considered to be safe and effective, with a 
ninety-two to ninety-five percent success rate, comparable to that 
of surgical abortion.29 As I will discuss in more detail below,30 
numerous studies have confirmed the safety and efficacy of the at-
home administration not only of the second pill, but of the entire 
regimen of medication abortion through telemedicine.31 These 
studies concluded that in-home administration was as safe, 
effective, and as acceptable to pregnant persons as clinic 
administration.32  
Telemedicine33—virtual consultation with a physician by 
video—has been an effective way to provide abortion-related 
 
 26. The FDA-approved regimen is detailed in the mifepristone package label. 
ACOG PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2. Since FDA approval, medication abortion 
has been used by almost two million women in the United States to end early pregnancies, 
about 200,000 a year. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Next Abortion Case Is Here, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/the-next-abortion
-case-is-here/?_r=0. 
 27. Mifepristone must be dispensed by a licensed medical office by the terms of the 
licensing agreement. See Mifeprex Prescriber’s Agreement, DANCO LABS., https://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsand
Providers/ucm111364.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).  
 28. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; ACOG 
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 3. 
 29. Christian Fiala & Kristina Gemsell-Danielsson, Review of Medical Abortion 
Using Mifepristone in Combination with a Prostaglandin Analogue, 74 CONTRACEPTION 
66, 69 (2006); Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171.  
 30. See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., Thoai D. Ngo et al., Comparative Effectiveness, Safety, and Acceptability 
of Medical Abortion at Home and in a Clinic: A Systemic Review, 89 BULLETIN WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 360, 370 (2011). 
 32. Id. at 360–70.  
 33. The doctor requirement also presumptively bans mid-level providers such as 
nurse-midwives, nurse-practitioners, and physicians-assistants from administering 
medication abortion, despite recommendations from WHO, the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Public Health Association, and the 
American Medical Women’s Association to increase training and use of mid-level 
providers for medication abortions. Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion 
Restrictions Burden Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early 
Abortion, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1 (2013). 
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healthcare to pregnant people in rural areas.34 When telemedicine 
is used in a clinical setting, a doctor talks with patients on-screen, 
reviews test results, and then the doctor dispenses the dosage of 
the pills remotely.35 The pills are dispensed in the clinic and the 
patient takes the pills at home.36 A current study underway is 
examining the effectiveness of providing abortion medication by 
mail using telemedicine, thereby entirely foregoing the need for a 
clinic visit.37 
When pregnant people end their own pregnancies using 
medication without medical supervision, they generally take 
misoprostol alone.38 Gynuity Health Projects and WHO have 
developed guidelines for self-induction using misoprostol alone.39 
This single medication method can safely induce an abortion and 
is eighty-five percent effective.40 The side effects of using the one-
drug regimen of misoprostol on its own are generally minimal and 
are similar to those associated with spontaneous miscarriage.41 
Much research has pointed to the safety and efficacy of the single-
drug regimen for medication abortion using misoprostol.42 
 
 34. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173. Telemedicine has been an effective way 
to provide abortion-related healthcare to rural women as evidenced by Planned 
Parenthood in Iowa’s successful program to use videoconferencing to provide abortion 
medications to more than 6,500 women in rural clinics. See Emily Bazelon, The Dawn of 
the Post-Clinic Abortion, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/31/magazine/the-dawn-of-the-post-clinic-abortion.html. 
 35. Bazelon, supra note 34. 
 36. Id. 
 37. After consulting with an abortion provider by videoconference, the patient is sent 
the necessary abortion medication by overnight mail. See TelAbortion Study FAQ, 
TELABORTION, http://telabortion.org/faq/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 38. The self-induction regimen is a one-pill regimen because mifepristone is 
expensive and must be distributed at a licensed medical office. See Mifeprex Prescriber’s 
Agreement, supra note 27. This protocol is often referred to as “miso-alone.” See, e.g., SAFE 
ABORTION, supra note 19, at 45. 
 39. Instructions for Use, GYNUITY HEALTH PROJECTS, http://gynuity.org/down
loads/clinguide_ifu_pphprevention_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2017); see also SAFE 
ABORTION, supra note 19, at 44. 
 40. See R. Kulier et al., Medical Methods for First Trimester Abortion, 2011 
COCHRANE DATABASE SYS. REVS. at 11. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Helena von Hertzen et al., World Health Org. Res. Grp. on Postovulatory 
Methods of Fertility Regulation, Efficacy of Two Intervals and Two Routes of 
Administration of Misoprostol for Terminating Pregnancy: A Randomized Controlled 
Equivalence Trial, 396 LANCET 1938, 1938–46 (2007); N.L. Moreno-Ruiz et al., Alternatives 
to Mifepristone for Early Medical Abortion, 96 INT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 212, 
216–18 (2007); Consensus Statement: Instructions for Use – Abortion Induction with 
Misoprostol in Pregnancy Up to 9 Weeks LMP, Expert Meeting on Misoprostol Sponsored 
LINDGREN_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17  7:00 AM 
350 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:341 
 
Research conducted under the auspices of WHO examined the 
prospect of permitting women to self-administer misoprostol 
rather than requiring a doctor visit and recommended the use of 
misoprostol alone in those settings where mifepristone is not 
available.43 
The home is central in all three contexts in which a pregnant 
person may choose to end a pregnancy using medication abortion: 
clinical supervision, telemedicine, and self-induction. Despite the 
proven safety, efficacy, and prevalence of at-home administration 
of medication abortion—both within and outside of the formal 
healthcare system—in the United States there is increasing 
pressure by anti-abortion groups to limit access to medication 
abortion within the formal healthcare context. The next section 
will examine restrictions on medication abortion through doctor 
requirements which also result in prohibitions on the use of 
telemedicine. 
B. RESTRICTIONS ON HOME-USE OF MEDICATION ABORTION 
In the last four years, nineteen states have passed legislation 
that requires pregnant people who take medication abortion to 
have both pills dispensed in the physical presence of a doctor.44 
This doctor requirement is contrary to FDA, ACOG and WHO 
protocols which provide that only the first pill, mifepristone, be 
dispensed by a medical facility.45 Laws that require the physical 
presence of the physician also preemptively ban the use of 
telemedicine.46 In states with a doctor requirement, a pregnant 
person seeking a medication abortion may have to travel long 
distance to visit a clinic attended by a physician, and attend in-
person counseling or undergo enforced ultrasound examinations 
that necessitate multiple trips to the clinic. These laws require 
pregnant persons to complete every step of the procedure in the 
physical presence of a physician, rather than in the privacy of the 
 
by Reproductive Health Technologies Project and Gynuity Health Projects, July 28, 2003, 
Washington, D.C. 
 43. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1174. 
 44. IBIS REPROD. HEALTH, supra note 17. 
 45. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at 114; ACOG 
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3, at 2. 
 46. Francine Coeytaux & Victoria Nichols, Plan C: The Safe Strategy for a Missed 
Period When You Don’t Want To Be Pregnant, REWIRE (Feb. 7, 2014), https://rewire.
news/article/2014/02/07/plan-c-safe-strategy-missed-period-dont-want-pregnant/. 
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home pursuant to approved guidelines.47 Justice Sotomayor 
highlighted this element of the issue of medication abortion 
during her questioning at recent oral arguments in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt: 
 
Justice Sotomayor: The medical abortion, that doesn’t 
involve any hospital procedure. A doctor prescribes two 
pills, and the women take the pills at home, correct? 
Ms. Toti: Under Texas law, she must take them at the 
facility, but that’s otherwise correct. 
Justice Sotomayor: I’m sorry. What? She has to come 
back two separate days to take them? 
Ms. Toti: That’s correct, yes. 
Justice Sotomayor: All right. So now, from when she 
could take it at home, now she has to travel 200 miles or 
pay for a hotel to get these two days of treatment?48 
 
These state laws that require abortion medications be 
dispensed in a healthcare setting contravene FDA labelling and 
ACOG protocols for medication abortion.49 These regulations 
also necessarily infringe on the right to exercise abortion-related 
self-care in the home by forcing pregnant people out of the home 
and into public healthcare settings. Justice Sotomayor’s 
questioning also highlighted that these requirements restrict 
access to abortion-related healthcare by adding difficulty, cost, 
distance, and time required to access a procedure that could 
otherwise be obtained after one visit—either virtual by 
telemedicine or in-person—to a healthcare provider. The next 
section will examine whether the added cost and difficulty of 
accessing medication abortion imposed by the doctor 
requirement creates an undue burden on abortion under Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey50 and Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.51 
 
 47. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3, at 114; ACOG 
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3. 
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).  
 49. See MANAGEMENT OF UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, supra note 3; ACOG 
PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 3. 
 50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 51. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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C. THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT AND THE UNDUE BURDEN 
STANDARD 
The Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey52 held that the right of abortion 
encompasses a woman’s right to have an abortion before viability 
“without undue interference from the State.”53 The state may 
express its interest in potential life by regulating abortion, so long 
as those regulations do not pose an “undue burden” on a woman’s 
ability to seek an abortion before viability.54 The undue burden 
standard was defined as “a state regulation [that] has the purpose 
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”55 While the state may 
seek to ensure that a woman’s choice is informed and protect the 
health and safety of a woman, the state may not prohibit the 
woman from making the ultimate decision to undergo an 
abortion.56 This “undue burden” standard downgraded the 
standard for judicial review from the strict scrutiny that had been 
applied by the courts in previous abortion cases based on the view 
that abortion was a fundamental right.57 Opponents of the 
abortion right argued that the standard was little more than 
rational basis review.58 
In 2015 the Supreme Court clarified the undue burden 
standard in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.59 In that case, 
the Court considered a Texas law, H.B. 2, that required abortion 
providers to secure admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and 
required that abortion clinics meet the requirements of 
 
 52. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 53. Id. at 846. 
 54. Id. at 874. 
 55. Id. at 877. 
 56. Id. at 878–79. 
 57. See MURRAY & LUKER, supra note 4, at 775–76 (explaining that the undue 
burden standard replaced the strict scrutiny standard and was originally proposed by 
Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).  
 58. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: 
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 
149, 152 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-difference-a-whole-woman- 
makes (describing how the “undue burden” standard in the recent decision provided more 
than mere rational basis deference, but rather that the Court “balance[d] benefits and 
burdens [to] call into question myriad health-justified restrictions on abortion”); see, e.g., 
Brief for Respondents at 21–23, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016) (No. 15-274). 
 59. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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ambulatory surgical centers.60 The Court required that states offer 
an evidentiary basis to substantiate its claim that abortion 
restrictions protected women’s health.61 Under the new analysis, 
it is the role of the courts to interrogate the veracity of healthcare 
claims underlying abortion restrictions. Next, the courts must 
balance the purported health benefits of an abortion regulation 
against the burdens placed upon women’s access to abortion-
related healthcare.62 The Court found a “virtual absence of any 
health benefit”63 from the Texas law and detailed the law’s 
detrimental effect on women’s access to abortion-related 
healthcare.64 
Medication abortion using the two-drug regimen under a 
doctor’s supervision is considered to be safe and effective.65 
Studies have confirmed the safety and efficacy of the at-home 
administration not only of the second pill, but of the entire 
regimen of medication abortion through telemedicine.66 These 
studies concluded that in-home administration was as safe, 
effective and as acceptable to pregnant persons as clinic 
administration.67 ACOG reviewed the medical literature on at-
home medication abortion and concluded that pregnant persons 
can “safely and effectively” use telemedicine to have medication 
abortion at home.68 An analysis of pooled data from nine studies 
conducted by WHO found home-based medication abortions to 
be as effective as those administered in clinics, noting that “home-
based medication abortions may have several advantages over 
clinic-based protocols, including allowing for greater privacy and 
lessening the burden on both women and service providers by 
reducing the number of clinic visits.”69 
 
 60. See Act of July 12, 2013, ch. 1, §§ 1-12, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4795-4802 (West) 
(codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 171.041-048, 171.061-064, 
245.010-011 (West 2015) and TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 164.052, 055 (West 2015)). 
 61. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 62. Id. at 2309 (stating that Casey “requires that courts consider the burdens a law 
imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”).  
 63. Id. at 2313. 
 64. Id. at 2311–12, 2315. 
 65. Fiala & Gemsell-Danielsson, supra note 29. 
 66. Ngo et al., supra note 31. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Bazelon, supra note 34.  
 69. Medication Abortion May Be Equally Safe Whether Done at Home or Clinic, 37 
INT’L PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 160 (2011). In light of its safety and 
efficacy, some researchers are calling for miso-alone to be available over-the-counter and 
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Research has revealed that self-induced abortion using the 
single-drug regimen for medication abortion using misoprostol is 
safe and effective.70 WHO examined the safety of self-
administered medication abortion using misoprostol alone, as 
opposed to the two-drug regimen that requires a doctor visit, and 
recommended the use of misoprostol alone in those settings 
where mifepristone is not available.71 The WHO safe abortion 
guidelines provide that misoprostol can be used alone to safely 
end a pregnancy through twelve weeks after the first day of the 
last menstrual period.72 Medication abortion via telemedicine has 
also been studied and found to be safe and effective. WHO 
reviewed the medical literature and concluded that pregnant 
persons “can safely and effectively” use telemedicine to have an 
abortion, including taking misoprostol at home.73 Despite the 
consistent findings of safety and efficacy of telemedicine, 
Arkansas and Idaho have recently adopted new restrictions on 
telemedicine for medication abortion, joining sixteen other states 
in barring use of telemedicine for abortion-related healthcare.74 
Further, the Whole Woman’s Health decision is significant 
because it calls into question onerous health regulations that 
single out abortion for regulation that do not apply to other 
procedures that pose much greater risk. The Whole Woman’s 
Health Court found that health care claims asserted in H.B. 2 were 
called into question when the state did not similarly regulate more 
dangerous procedures, such as colonoscopy, liposuction, and 
childbirth.75 Similarly, the doctor requirement in medication 
 
have suggested calling it “Plan C” in reference to the morning-after pill, RU486, that is 
sold under the name “Plan B.” See Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46. 
 70. See, e.g., von Hertzen et al., supra note 42; Moreno-Ruiz et al., supra note 42; 
Consensus Statement, supra note 42. 
 71. Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that pregnant people throughout 
much of the world ingest misoprostol to end pregnancies without medical supervision). 
Misoprostol is readily available over the counter elsewhere in the world and is commonly 
used to induce abortion outside of clinical settings. Id. Indeed, in an effort to reduce the 
number of deaths due to illegal abortions throughout much of Latin America, Africa, Asia 
and the Persian Gulf, WHO recently put mifepristone and misoprostol on its Essential 
Medicines List. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171. 
 72. Coeytaux & Nichols, supra note 46; Bela Ganatra et al., From Concept to 
Measurement: Operationalizing WHO’s Definition of Unsafe Abortion, 92 BULLETIN 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 153, 155 (2014). 
 73. Ngo et al., supra note 31; see also Gomperts et al., supra note 21. 
 74. IBIS, supra note 17. 
 75. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2315 (2016). Indeed, in 
her concurrence, Justice Ginsberg stated that, “Given those realities, it is beyond rational 
belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law 
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abortion singles out abortion at home for regulation at the same 
time that other types of self-care at home are being expanded in 
an effort to lower healthcare costs. For example, Medicare is now 
taking steps to make it easier for people to do their own kidney 
dialysis at home.76 Not only does at-home use save money, but 
federal Medicare authorities as well as doctors recognize that 
patients do better when they are active participants in their own 
care, while at the same time improving patient’s experience and 
lowering medical costs.77 
Like other forms of home-based care such as dialysis, 
medication abortion significantly lowers the cost and difficulty of 
accessing abortion. For this reason, anti-abortion groups are 
particularly focused on restricting the use of medication abortion. 
The doctor requirement’s mandate that the medication abortion 
regimen must be performed in the physical presence of a doctor 
infringes upon a pregnant person’s ability to engage in 
reproductive self-care in the privacy of the home, without any 
cognizable health care benefits, thus calling into question the 
claim that these restrictions seek to protect women’s health. What 
is more, like H.B. 2 in Whole Woman’s Health, it is clear that the 
doctor requirement is motivated by opposition to abortion rather 
than by concern for protecting women’s health. As scholar and 
journalist Linda Greenhouse summed it up, “if you think about it, 
it’s evident why opponents of abortion have begun to focus on the 
early nonsurgical procedure. Medical abortion is the ultimate in 
women’s reproductive empowerment and personal privacy.”78 
At least two courts have overturned doctor requirement 
restrictions based on the undue burden analysis because of lack of 
purported healthcare benefits for requiring that pregnant people 
be in a doctor’s physical presence to end their own pregnancies. 
The Ninth Circuit, in McCormack v. Herzog,79 held that an Idaho 
provision that required that all second trimester abortions be 
performed in a hospital violated the rights of women who wished 
to obtain pre-viability abortions from a physician prescribing 
 
‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’” Id. at 2321 (quoting 
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 76. Eric Whitney, Feds Say More People Should Try Dialysis at Home, NPR NEWS 
(Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/10/04/492932675/feds-say-
more-people-should-try-dialysis-at-home. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Greenhouse, supra note 26. 
 79. 788 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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FDA-approved medication abortions.80 Jeanne McCormack 
chose to end her own pregnancy using misoprostol that she 
obtained online, because there were no licensed abortion 
providers in southeastern Idaho where she lived and the nearest 
abortion clinic in Salt Lake City would cost between four hundred 
and two thousand dollars.81 She obtained the pills online for two 
hundred dollars and successfully ended her own pregnancy at 
home.82 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine, 
struck down a regulation banning the use of telemedicine for 
medication abortion, arguing that the imposition posed an undue 
burden on women’s access to abortion without sufficient evidence 
that it protected women’s health.83 The case involved a program 
set up by Planned Parenthood in Iowa in 2008 that used 
videoconferencing to provide abortion medications to more than 
6,500 pregnant people in rural clinics.84 In 2010, the Iowa Medical 
Board conducted a study of the program and found that the 
telemedicine program was safe and met the prevailing standard of 
care.85 Despite these findings, the Iowa Right to Life organization 
put pressure on Governor Terry Brandstad, who then replaced 
the board. The new board voted to halt telemedicine for abortions 
in Iowa.86 
II. MEDICATION ABORTION AS ZONAL, RELATIONAL, 
AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY 
This section considers the extent to which medication 
abortion at home falls within privacy’s traditional framework of 
zonal, relational, and decisional privacy. First, this section argues 
that medication abortion at home falls within the right of privacy 
 
 80. Id. at 1029–30. 
 81. Id. at 1022 n.3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 
269 (Iowa 2015). 
 84. Bazelon, supra note 34; Eric Wicklund, Abortion-by-Telemedicine Pilot 
Launches in Four States, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 1, 2016), http://mhealth
intelligence.com/news/abortion-by-telemedicine-pilot-launches-in-4-states. 
 85. Daniel Grossman et al., Effectiveness and Acceptability of Medical Abortion 
Provided Through Telemedicine, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 295, 296–303 (2011) 
[hereinafter Grossman, Telemedicine] (finding that abortion via telemedicine was safe and 
effective with comparable clinical outcomes to face-to-face provision of medication 
abortion and a very high patient satisfaction rate).  
 86. Id. 
LINDGREN_DRAFT 6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17  7:00 AM 
2017] THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT 357 
 
of the home as a physical zone free from governmental 
surveillance and third party intrusion. I highlight that the 
Constitution protects against government intrusions into the 
home and the common law protects individuals against invasions 
into the solitude and repose in their home by third parties who are 
not governmental actors. In both contexts—surveillance by 
governmental actors and intrusion by non-governmental actors—
the Supreme Court affords heightened protection of the home 
against surveillance and the home acts as a refuge that protects 
the right to be let alone. Second, this section argues that the 
nature of the privacy right in medication abortion at home falls 
within privacy as a substantive right related to decisional 
autonomy. Finally, it argues that self-induced abortion at home, 
whether inside or outside of medical supervision, represents 
privacy of intimate association that engages important notions of 
dignity and autonomy that take place in the context of intimate 
relationships. 
A. MEDICATION ABORTION AND ZONAL PRIVACY  
WITHIN THE HOME 
The home has long served an important role in the Supreme 
Court’s privacy analysis in both common law and constitutional 
law. As early as colonial times there existed a strong principle that 
a “man’s house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is well 
guarded as a prince in his castle.”87 Both constitutional law and 
common law delineate the home as privileged space for 
heightened privacy protection.88 The constitutional right of 
privacy that identifies the home as a physical zone free from 
governmental intrusion can be found in the Third Amendment 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in the home;89 
 
 87. Paxton’s Case of the Writ of Assistance, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF 
CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE 
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 51 (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co., 1865); see also Seymayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he 
house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress.”); Note, The Right to Privacy in 
Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (1981). 
 88. See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (describing the 
“fundamental right” to be free from governmental intrusions into the privacy of the 
bedroom); see also Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (arguing that 
the mailbox fit within the zone of privacy of repose within the home).  
 89. The Third Amendment provides: “No soldier shall, in times of peace, be 
quartered in any house, without consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner 
to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
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however, it is the Fourth Amendment that guarantees the most 
extensive privacy rights against governmental intrusion into the 
home.90 With respect to the protection against surveillance, the 
Supreme Court has stated that “[w]e have said that the Fourth 
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance of the house.’”91 
This zonal paradigm of privacy protects against third party and 
governmental surveillance into “the sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life.”92 In Stanley v. Georgia, Justice Marshall 
described the “fundamental right” to be free from governmental 
intrusions into the privacy of the bedroom.93 Louis Brandeis has 
argued that both the common law right of privacy in tort regarding 
the flow of information, and the Fourth Amendment right of 
privacy of physical space, flow from the same source: “the right to 
be let alone.”94 
Medication abortion in the home, both self-induced and 
under a doctor’s supervision, falls squarely within privacy law’s 
traditional framework of zonal privacy. The home offers 
enhanced privacy protection from third-party intrusion and 
governmental surveillance for pregnant people accessing 
medication abortion. This is especially true for pregnant people 
who are living in poverty, of color,95 and with compromised 
immigration status, because pregnancies for these vulnerable 
groups are disproportionately subjected to surveillance through 
public health insurance, public support agencies, and immigration 
check-points.96 Much scholarship has explored the intersection of 
reproductive rights and state surveillance of communities of 
 
 90. The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, for “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Privacy in the context of constitutional law first 
appeared in cases involving the Fourth Amendment. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 
298, 304 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
 91. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)) (holding that the police could not use thermal imaging to detect heat 
patterns emanating from the defendant’s house because even though the surveillance was 
conducted outside the defendant’s home, the thermal-imaging device was gathering 
information about activities within the home); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth 
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 144 (2002). 
 92. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
 93. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
 94. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 90 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY 
ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
 95. Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 15, 22.  
 96. See generally BRIDGES, supra note 16. 
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color.97 For these communities subjected to heightened 
surveillance, the ability to engage in abortion-related self-care in 
the home offers a sanctuary against governmental surveillance. 
Restrictions on medication abortion, both as self-induction 
through misoprostol alone and restrictions on ingesting 
medication at home under doctor supervision, increase the 
scrutiny of pregnant people, including those suffering poor 
pregnancy outcomes unrelated to the use of medication 
abortion.98 As I will describe below, the repercussions of such 
surveillance and policing will disproportionately impact 
immigrant communities, low-income individuals, and 
communities of color.99 
Immigrant communities, communities living in poverty, and 
communities of color who disproportionately live in poverty due 
to barriers resulting from historic discrimination and lack of 
economic opportunity100 are under greater scrutiny by police and 
governmental agencies, making them more likely to have their 
pregnancies subject to surveillance.101 This heightened scrutiny 
results from a greater likelihood that people living in poverty and 
people of color will be under governmental surveillance as the 
result of receiving public assistance, being supervised by parole 
officers, and under the care of public health systems.102 For 
pregnant people in these communities, abortion self-induction in 
the home offers greater protection from governmental 
surveillance that particularly targets communities of color living 
 
 97. See, e.g., id. at 41–71; see also CHILD WELFARE, supra note 16, at 25–46; 
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 294–312; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16. 
 98. People who live in poverty are more likely to suffer poor pregnancy outcomes 
due to socioeconomic factors and systemic problems. Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16 at 
20; see also Lynn Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant 
Women in the United States (1973-2005): The Implications for Women’s Legal Status and 
Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 299, 310–12 (2013) (discussing the criminalization 
of women for negative birth or pregnancy outcomes and the connection between poverty 
and negative birth outcomes).  
 99. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 14; SILLIMAN ET AL., supra note 14; Gutiérrez, 
supra note 14; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 98; Smith, supra note 14. 
 100. See, e.g., Christine Dehlendorf et al., Disparities in Abortion Rates: A Public 
Health Approach, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1772, 1773 (2013) (“Classifications of race, 
ethnicity, and [social economic status] . . . reflect larger systems of structural inequality, 
including racism and systematic inequalities in both opportunities and power.”). 
 101. BRIDGES, supra note 16; ROBERTS, supra note 14; CHILD WELFARE, supra note 
16; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16.  
 102. See, e.g., Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 27; BRIDGES, supra note 16; 
ROBERTS, supra note 14; CHILD WELFARE, supra note 16; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 
98; Roberts & Vagle, supra note 16. 
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in poverty. What is more, lack of abortion clinic access, lack of 
health insurance coverage for abortion-related healthcare, and 
lack of resources to pay out of pocket for clinic-based care push 
people living in poverty towards medication abortion self-
induction, because it is less expensive and more accessible than 
clinic-based care. 
The role of the home as shield against governmental 
surveillance is critical in the context of medication self-induction 
abortion for pregnant people who are undocumented.103 Pregnant 
people with compromised immigration status often turn to 
medication self-induction outside of the formal healthcare system 
because their ability to travel long distances to obtain 
reproductive healthcare is limited by the threat of apprehension, 
detention, and deportation, which severely restricts their travel 
and movement.104 There has been an increase in immigration 
enforcement in the last ten years, which has resulted in a dramatic 
rise in detentions and deportations as well as increased policing of 
communities along the southern border of the United States.105 
For these pregnant people, the best choice for accessing abortion 
is often by obtaining medication from one of the border mercados 
or at a pharmacy across the border in Mexico where misoprostol 
is sold over the counter without a prescription.106 At-home 
abortion for these pregnant people allows them to end their own 
 
 103. See COLLINS, supra note 14, at 18 (describing a “matrix of domination” to refer 
to the way intersection systems of oppression function to discipline the lives of 
marginalized and oppressed populations); see also ROBERTS, supra note 14; SILLIMAN, 
supra note 14; Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 1449 (“The interplay between structures and 
identities are key elements in understanding the ways that [women of color] are situated 
within and affected by the various systems of social control.”); Gutiérrez, supra note 14; 
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 98. 
 104. See Madeline M. Gomez, Intersection at the Border: Immigration Enforcement, 
Reproductive Oppression, and the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 84, 86 (2015) (noting that the intersection of immigration 
enforcement and reproductive oppression results in acute lack of access to reproductive 
healthcare for women who lack legal immigration status).  
 105. Id. at 91–92; see also Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. 
Deportations of Immigrants Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-
record-high-in-2013/. 
 106. See Daniel Grossman et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to 
Abortion Self-Induction in Texas, TEX. POL’Y EVALUATION PROJECT, at 1 (Nov. 17, 2015) 
[hereinafter TexPEP Policy Brief] (finding that in the wake of Texas’ passage of H.B. 2, 
one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country, there has been an increase in the 
use of self-induction abortion through medication). See also Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of 
the DIY Abortion in Texas, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com
/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/. 
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pregnancies safely, at low cost, in the comfort of their homes, and 
without the threat of detention by immigration enforcement.107 A 
study published last year found that in 2013 after the Texas 
legislature passed the controversial state law, H.B. 2, which 
shuttered thirty of the state’s forty-eight abortion clinics, 
somewhere between 100,000 and 240,000 women of reproductive 
age living in Texas tried to end their pregnancy entirely on their 
own, without any medical assistance.108 Against the backdrop of 
immigration enforcement, the home features as a classic refuge 
from state surveillance, as described in the privacy case law 
related to Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections. 
There is a significant privacy interest for pregnant people to 
choose medication abortion at home for purposes of ensuring 
privacy’s elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude against 
intrusion by non-governmental third parties. For example, at-
home use of medication abortion protects pregnant people 
against third party surveillance by anti-abortion activists. 
Permitting an individual to take medication to end their own 
pregnancy in the privacy of their home spares them the aggressive 
harassment and public shaming that occurs when a pregnant 
person attempts to enter an abortion facility in many cities.109 In 
this way, the home serves its traditional function in privacy case 
law, of shielding individuals from intrusion by third parties. 
Further, new technology called “geo-fencing” has allowed anti-
abortion groups to use mobile phone surveillance techniques to 
identify “abortion-minded women” via their cell phone’s 
 
 107. Hellerstein, supra note 106. 
 108. TexPEP Policy Brief, supra note 106, at 2. 
 109. See generally DAVID S. COHEN & KRYSTEN CANNON, LIVING IN THE 
CROSSHAIRS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM (2015). For 
descriptions by the Supreme Court of aggressive tactics used by anti-abortion protesters at 
clinics, see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (2014) (describing protesters “who 
express their moral or religious opposition to abortion through sign and chants or, in some 
cases, more aggressive methods such as face-to-face confrontation”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703, 708 (2000) (describing demonstrations in front of abortion clinics that impeded 
access to the clinics and were often confrontational and included counselors who 
sometimes used strong and abusive language in face-to-face encounters); Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 358 (1997) (invalidating the use of 
“floating buffer zones”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994) 
(upholding thirty-six-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances and driveways); see also 
Brief for Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts & Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 WL 
2882079 (2014) (No. 12-1168) (describing “thirty years of violent protests and patient 
harassment” at abortion clinics including the murder of two clinic employees).  
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proximity to an abortion clinic. The technology allows anti-
abortion groups to collect data on persons at abortion clinics and 
to send anti-abortion propaganda directly to their cell phones as 
they sit in abortion clinic waiting rooms.110 The technology also 
has the ability to collect data from cell phones such as the names 
and addresses of persons seeking abortion-related healthcare if 
they have visited a clinic.111 While it is beyond the scope of this 
project, it is important to note that this type of surveillance and 
data collection violates individuals’ privacy over the flow of 
information as a common law right against third parties in tort for 
public disclosure of private facts.112 This type of surveillance by 
non-governmental actors is largely unregulated and is only 
possible when a pregnant person enters an abortion clinic. As 
these examples highlight, the home thus serves its traditional 
function as a shield that protects pregnant people accessing 
abortion-related healthcare from surveillance and harassment by 
anti-abortion protesters, either in person or through electronic 
surveillance. 
For pregnant people in abusive relationships, home-based 
abortion care may offer the safety and privacy necessary to 
protect them from further violence. The Supreme Court 
recognized the relationship between abortion and domestic 
violence in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.113 The Casey opinion struck down Pennsylvania’s spousal 
consent requirement for abortion based on the findings that such 
notification would expose battered partners to further abuse.114 
 
 110. Sharona Coutts, Anti-Choice Croups Use Smartphone Surveillance to Target 
“Abortion-Minded Women” During Clinic Visits, REWIRE (May 25, 2016), 
https://rewire.news/article/2016/05/25/anti-choice-groups-deploy-smartphone-surveillance
-target-abortion-minded-women-clinic-visits/.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Jerry Kang has 
identified this type of privacy as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under which 
personal information — information identifiable to the individual — is acquired, disclosed, 
and used.” Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1205 (1998). Much scholarship has addressed concerns with this type of data 
collection and the ability of individuals to control the flow of information about themselves 
with respect to information technology and cyberspace. See generally FRED H. CATE, 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC 
SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993); PRISCILLA M. 
REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1995). 
 113. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 114. Id. at 892–93. 
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Violence by intimate partners increases in pregnancy both in 
frequency and in intensity.115 The Casey Court noted that, “[m]ere 
notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering 
and violence within the family.”116 The Casey Court concluded: 
[T]he District Court’s findings reinforce what common sense 
would suggest. . . . [T]here are millions of women in this country 
who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse 
at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become 
pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to 
inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion.117 
In light of the risk of violence associated with pregnancy and 
abortion, it is often critical for pregnant people in abusive 
relationships who seek abortions to find a way to end their own 
pregnancies. Abortion self-induction mimics miscarriage and is 
undetectable when the pills are taken orally.118 Clinic-based 
abortion care often requires taking time off work to go to clinics, 
this is especially true in those states where taking the two pills for 
medication abortion requires two separate trips to the abortion 
 
 115. Beth A. Bailey, Partner Violence During Pregnancy: Prevalence, Effects, 
Screening, and Management, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 183 (2010); Julie A. 
Gazmararian et al., Prevalence of Violence Against Pregnant Women, 275 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 667, 672 (1996); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant 
Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 672 (2006). Indeed, in the United States, homicide is the leading 
cause of death among pregnant women. Jeani Chang et al., Homicide: A Leading Cause of 
Injury Deaths Among Pregnant and Postpartum Women in the United States, 1991-1999, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 471, 473 (2005). A survivor of domestic violence who is forced to 
carry the pregnancy to term is less able to leave the abusive relationship because abusers 
often use threats of abuse against children as a means of coercion and control and the birth 
of children is more likely to make mothers economically dependent on their abusers. See 
Brief for Experts and Organizations Supporting Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15–20, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) [hereinafter Intimate Partner Violence Amicus Brief].  
 116. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889. As the Casey Court recognized, “Many may fear 
devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including verbal 
harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical 
confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the 
abortion to family and friends.” Id. at 893; see also id. at 889 (noting the district court 
findings that abusive partners may “threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an abortion 
to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child custody or 
divorce proceedings; (c) inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her 
children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family 
members or other loved ones; or (e) use his control over finances to deprive of necessary 
monies for herself or her children”). 
 117. 505 U.S. at 892–93.  
 118. Kulier et al., supra note 40. 
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clinic on two different days, often at long distance.119 When 
survivors of domestic violence are required to take pills in clinics; 
they run the risk of being seen entering a clinic; this is especially 
true because a common aspect of the coercion and control cycle 
of domestic violence involves abusive partners monitoring the 
movements of their victims.120 Abortion at home may offer safety 
and privacy for abused pregnant people to end their own 
pregnancies without giving notice to abusive partners. 
B. MEDICATION ABORTION AND PRIVACY OF  
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY 
Privacy’s second broad category is decisional autonomy 
which has been recognized in a series of cases, from Eisenstadt v. 
Baird121 to Roe v. Wade122 and its progeny. The Eisenstadt case 
extended the right of unmarried people to access contraception. 
The Court articulated the right by saying, “If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”123 In 1973 the Supreme Court in Roe v. 
Wade recognized that the right of privacy as decisional autonomy 
extended to encompass the abortion decision. There, the Court 
held that, “This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”124 Justice Stevens, in Whalen v. Roe, expressed the 
 
 119. Justice Sotomayor raised this issue during questioning at oral argument in Whole 
Woman’s Health. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 120. Intimate partner violence involves coercion and control, and violence is just one 
way that abusive partners use to exert control. As the amici experts in intimate partner 
violence in Whole Woman’s Health explain, these tactics of coercive control also involve 
isolating the abused person from family and friends and monitoring her whereabouts and 
relationships by “track[ing] their use of transportation, and catalog[ing] their time spent 
out of the home.” Intimate Partner Violence Amicus Brief, supra note 115, at 7–8 (citing 
Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117, 2126–27 (1993); LEIGH GOODMARK, A 
TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 42 (2011)).  
 121. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 123. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 124. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court framed the decisional right as the right to decide 
to terminate a pregnancy in consultation with a “responsible physician.” Id. This 
conceptualization has been widely criticized for subordinating the constitutional rights of 
pregnant people to the judgment of their doctors. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Doctors, 
Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician’s Role in “Private” 
Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 183, 197–201 (1985); Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s 
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privacy right in abortion cases as an “interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions.”125 
Laws that restrict at-home use of medication abortion 
necessarily limit the right of pregnant people to make choices 
about the care they will receive. While abortion opponents may 
argue that the doctor requirement does not restrict abortion itself, 
only the way that abortion-related healthcare is delivered, this 
argument fails to recognize that decisions over medical care are at 
the heart of decisional autonomy. For example, Justice 
Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey126 identified abortion as a 
right of reproductive choice, stating: “Just as the Due Process 
Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to 
refuse medical treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal 
decision to obtain medical treatment, including a woman’s 
decision to terminate a pregnancy.”127 In his concurring opinion in 
Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas argued that abortion was a right of 
health that was related to privacy, describing the medical privacy 
right as “the right to care for one’s health and person and to seek 
out a physician of one’s own choice.”128 His concurrence identified 
abortion specifically as a right of privacy related to healthcare, 
rather than as a right of privacy related to procreation, marriage, 
and childrearing.129 He described this right of healthcare by 
stating, “The right to seek advice on one’s health and the right to 
place reliance on the physician of one’s choice are basic to 
Fourteenth Amendment values.”130 He argued in Roe that the 
term “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment included “the 
freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily 
restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk or stroll or loaf.”131 This 
 
Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1879 
(2010) (arguing that Roe v. Wade gave only “confused expression” to women as 
constitutional rights holders in the abortion decision and gave greater protection to 
doctors’ rights to make medical decisions than to women’s rights to control reproduction); 
Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–79 (1992); see also Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992). 
 125. 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 127. Id. at 928 n.3 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
 128. Roe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J. concurring). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 219–20. 
 131. Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted). 
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characterization of the abortion right highlights that the ability to 
make healthcare decisions about abortion, like the decision to end 
one’s own pregnancy at home, is integral to the right of decisional 
autonomy. Prohibitions on the use of medication abortion within 
the home through the doctor requirement infringe on the liberty 
and autonomy of reproductive decision-making that the Court has 
recognized at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 
For many pregnant people, self-directed abortion care may 
be an expression of values and belief systems and reflects notions 
of autonomy and liberty that go beyond mere healthcare.133 
Researchers have found that many pregnant people prefer 
medication abortion in the privacy of their homes over clinic-
based care because they view it as more natural to expel the 
product of conception by miscarriage than through surgery.134 
Further, many prefer medication abortion at home because it 
offers greater privacy than a clinical setting.135 A review of twelve 
published studies on patient attitudes and reactions to early first-
trimester pregnancy termination by medication showed 
consistently that when given a choice between medication and 
surgical abortion, sixty to seventy percent of patients chose the 
medication method.136 The most common reasons cited for 
choosing medication over surgery were greater privacy and 
autonomy, less invasiveness, and greater naturalness than 
surgery.137 Thus, the decision to self-induce abortion, inside or 
outside of the healthcare context, may express deeply held values 
and beliefs about health, nature, feminist values, or religion.138 
 
 132. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords 
constitutional protection to personal decision relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
 133. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 58, at 14. 
 134. Daniel Grossman et al., Self-Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United 
States, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 142, 142 (2010); Gomperts et al., supra note 
21, at 1173; Beverly Winikoff et al., Acceptability of Medical Abortion in Early Pregnancy, 
27 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPS. 142, 142–48 (1995). 
 135. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1171; Grossman et al., supra note 134, at 142; 
Winikoff et al., supra note 134, at 142–48.  
 136. Gomperts et al., supra note 21, at 1173 (noting that studies have shown that a 
majority of women prefer at-home use of medication to clinic-based care); Grossman, 
Telemedicine, supra note 85, at 296–303.  
 137. Id. 
 138. This argument has been set forth in the context of home birth but in many ways 
parallels to at-home abortion. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 855 (describing that childbirth 
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Medication abortion at home should be understood as more 
than simply a medical decision or personal preference. The 
decision to end a pregnancy at-home through use of medication 
engages the very values expressed by the Casey Court in its 
description of abortion as a protected part of the fundamental 
right of privacy: “These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central 
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”139 The decision to 
exercise reproductive autonomy within the privacy of the home 
relates to bodily integrity and the right to exercise autonomy 
within the sacred precinct of the home.140 Abortion self-induction 
in the home involves reproductive autonomy which the Supreme 
Court has deemed as a protected interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.141 Indeed, the Court has described reproductive 
autonomy as being integral to the very core of human identity.142 
C. MEDICATION ABORTION AND PRIVACY  
OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
Finally, the right of privacy has been recognized to include 
privacy of intimate relationships. Most notably, the decisions in 
Griswold v. Connecticut143 and Lawrence v. Texas144 drew upon 
the privacy case law related to protection of the physical 
boundaries of the home, and extended it to emphasize that it is 
not merely the physical confines of the home, but the deeply 
personal activities that occur within the home, that are protected 
by the right of privacy. The Griswold Court relied upon privacy 
 
choice expresses deeply held beliefs and values); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of 
the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 549 (1994) (“[E]fforts to employ this alternative approach 
[of home birth] can be seen as acts of resistance to the dominant order, acts informed by 
an alternative set of understandings of the world that medicine purports to know.”). 
 139. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992). 
 140. There is a growing recognition of the importance of self-directed care at home in 
many contexts. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.  
 142. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.”). 
 143. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a portion of a Connecticut 
statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives).  
 144. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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cases that related to physical zones of privacy in the Third, Fourth, 
and First Amendments to conclude that the guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights “have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance.”145 This 
substantive right of privacy overlaps with both spatial privacy of 
the marital bedroom and substantive privacy in reproductive 
decisions that take place within intimate relationships. The 
Griswold decision addressed the intrusion into the physical 
confines of the home, specifically the marital bedroom, but also 
the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”146 The Court 
stated that the case involved “a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of 
contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, 
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive 
impact upon that relationship.”147 
The Lawrence Court, like the Griswold Court, expanded the 
right of privacy of physical space within the home to include the 
private activities and relationships that take place and find refuge 
in the home. The Lawrence Court described the right of intimate 
association as: 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our 
tradition, the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there 
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, 
where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom 
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of 
the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent 
dimensions.148 
 
 145. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.  
 146. Id. at 485–86. 
 147. Id. at 485. 
 148. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
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Thus, under the Supreme Court’s privacy analysis, the home 
has become a sanctuary for the exercise of the most personal 
rights related to humanity149 and dignity.150 
The doctor requirement is a governmental intrusion into 
intimate personal activity that makes it incongruous with privacy 
of intimate association. Medication abortion at home allows a 
pregnant person to end a pregnancy in the comfort of home, 
surrounded by family and support of friends, rather than in a 
clinical setting.151 Others may choose a medical abortion at home 
because it offers privacy and solitude that is not available in a 
clinical setting. Thus, it is important to recognize that privacy 
interest at stake in medication abortion at home may involve 
matters of personal significance related to procreation within the 
context of the home as a location of intimacy and support that 
goes beyond merely a location for healthcare delivery.152 
III. THE DOCTOR REQUIREMENT AND THE 
LIMITATIONS OF PRIVACY 
While medication abortion at-home falls within privacy’s 
traditional analysis as a zonal, relational, and decisional right, this 
section argues that privacy is inadequate to encompass the 
interests at stake in medication abortion at home. As the 
foregoing discussion reveals, a myriad of economic, political, and 
social forces influence a pregnant person to choose medication 
abortion at home. The forces that push people toward ending 
their own pregnancies at home include poverty, inaccessibility of 
 
 149. Kenneth Karst has written on the privacy right of intimate association that flows 
from the First Amendment. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
YALE L.J. 624, 692 (1980) (“The freedom to choose our intimates and to govern our day-
to-day relations with them . . . is the foundation for the one responsibility among all others 
that most clearly defines our humanity.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[H]ere 
we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which characteristically has 
its place in the home.”).  
 151. See Patel Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 14; see also Grossman et al., supra note 
134, at 142. 
 152. For the parallels between home-birth and abortion at-home, see Cohen, supra 
note 6, at 868–77; McCormick, supra note 6, at 682–93. Personal empowerment and 
autonomy are values that have long animated the practice of reproductive self-care in a 
variety of contexts from home birth to at-home miscarriage management. See Patel 
Amicus Brief, supra note 16, at 14 (citing Josee Lafrance & Lyne Mailhot, Empowerment: 
A Concept Well-Suited for Midwifery, 4 CAN. J. MIDWIFERY RES. & PRAC. 2 (2005)); 
Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to Dignity: Drawing Lessons from the Movements for 
Aid in Dying and Reproductive Rights, 5 UTAH L. REV. 779 (2016). 
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clinics and waiting periods, immigration policy, family violence, 
and failure to protect against and police clinic harassment, to 
name only a few. As I will describe in this section, the doctor 
requirement reveals that public, private, and state-sponsored 
harm are imposed on pregnant people ending their pregnancies at 
home that are not adequately captured or conceptualized in 
privacy’s conceptual framework of individuals exercising rights in 
the privacy of the home. Identifying medication abortion at home 
as a right of privacy fails to acknowledge the ways in which third 
party and state actions and policies come to bear upon—and 
ultimately circumscribe—the ability of individuals to make 
reproductive decisions in the home. In other words, privacy law’s 
traditional analysis fails to acknowledge the myriad of political, 
economic, and social systems that influence and effect decision-
making in this context. 
Privacy jurisprudence reinforces a liberal notion of what has 
been described as the “atomistic man,” or the conceptual 
framework that views individuals as separate, atomistic 
individuals competing for legal rights rather than recognizing 
individuals as interconnected, dependent, and existing within a 
community.153 The Court in Stanley v. Georgia described that right 
of privacy in relation to the “man sitting alone in his house.”154 
This idealized liberal notion of the individual embodies a 
distinctively masculine perspective that fails to account for the 
lived experiences of women whose lives are often marked by 
interdependence, caregiving, connection, and responsibility.155 As 
the preceding section highlighted, rather than “atomistic” 
individuals exercising rights in the privacy of their homes, 
pregnant people who choose medication abortion may be 
individuals whose choices are necessarily affected by where they 
are situated within social, political, and economic systems. 
Poverty, immigration status, and violence in the home are but a 
 
 153. See Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174–76 (1992).  
 154. In Stanley v. Georgia, Justice Marshall wrote, of the “fundamental right” to be 
free from governmental intrusions into the privacy of the bedroom: “If the First 
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” 394 U.S. 
557, 565 (1969). 
 155. McClain, supra note 153, at 1174; see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE 87–89 (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 
(1988). 
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few of the factors that may push pregnant people toward 
medication abortion at home. In light of these realities, the 
privacy analysis fails to recognize the ways that public forces 
impact private decision-making. 
A central focus of feminist theorizing has been to critique the 
right of privacy, especially as it has been conceptualized as a zone 
free from governmental regulation.156 The liberal conception of 
the constitutional protection of personal or family privacy—often 
centered within the home—fails to take into account that the 
home is a realm in which women have unequal power and are 
physically vulnerable.157 For example, familial privacy has 
historically been used as a rationale to shield the private abuse of 
domestic violence from public scrutiny and prosecution.158 Courts 
and police agencies often refused to arrest and prosecute 
batterers because of their reluctance to intrude upon the privacy 
of the home and family.159 Thus, the private sphere of the home 
free of unwanted governmental and community interference must 
be understood in the context of social and sexual inequality.160 As 
scholar Anita Allen has argued, the liberal conception of the 
private realm free of state interference “undervalues private 
inequality and overstates individual agency.”161 
 
 156. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) 
(“The dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of 
feminist writing and political struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is 
about.”); Tracey E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847–48 (2000) (explaining that attacking the public/private line 
has been one of the primary concerns of feminist theorizing for over two decades). 
 157. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 119 (1994); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex 
Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (“[T]he law’s privacy is a sphere 
of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability.”). 
 158. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 157, at 119 (“[I]f patriarchal control of women’s 
choices and patriarchal domination of women’s inner and public lives occur in the very 
private realm of home life[,] then the Constitution, above all else, protects the very system 
of power and control that constrains us.”); MacKinnon, supra note 157, at 1318.  
 159. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2154–61 (1996). 
 160. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 54–56 (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. 
Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 101–02 (1987); Nadine 
Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328–55 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990); 
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 813–23 (1999).  
 161. Higgins, supra note 156, at 851. 
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Similarly, it is critical to understand the privacy interest in 
medication abortion within the context of social and sexual 
inequality. Pregnant people do not come to the abortion decision 
with a full range of rights and privileges. Rather, they turn towards 
medication abortion because of systems of oppression, both 
private, such as intimate partner violence, as well as public, in the 
case of immigration surveillance, clinic harassment, and the cost 
and distance involved in accessing clinic-based abortion care. The 
unique burdens placed on individuals seeking to end their 
pregnancies because they are living in poverty, undocumented, 
living in rural areas far from an abortion clinic, or living in abusive 
relationships, are not captured by the privacy analysis. Scholar 
and activist Jael Silliman has described that  
conception of choice is rooted in the neoliberal tradition that 
locates individual rights at its core, and treats the individual’s 
control over her body as central to liberty and freedom. This 
emphasis on individual choice, however, obscures the social 
context in which individuals make choices, and discounts the 
ways in which the state regulates populations, disciplines 
individual bodies, and exercises control over sexuality, gender, 
and reproduction.162  
Therefore, despite the fact that medication abortion technically 
falls within the four corners of privacy’s doctrine, it is critical to 
acknowledge the political, social, and economic forces at play in 
private decision-making that takes place within the home. 
Private violence, third party surveillance and harassment, 
and governmental regulation all work in tandem to influence 
decision-making in the context of medication abortion at home. 
These structural systems and their influence on private decision-
making are not accounted for by privacy’s analysis, which 
conceptualizes the right in necessarily individualistic, isolated 
terms. Professor Kendall Thomas has described the combination 
 
 162. Jael Silliman, Introduction, in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY x–xi (Jael 
Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 2002). The movement for reproductive justice 
contextualizes decision-making to consider how lack of social support, access to 
healthcare, poverty, race, disability, age and rural location, for example, affect decision-
making. For more information on “reproductive justice,” see Reproductive Justice Virtual 
Library, CTR. ON REPROD. RTS. & JUST., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php- 
programs/centers/crrj/zotero/library.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2017). See generally Silliman 
et al., supra note 14; ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR 
ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 
AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2005); SISTERSONG WOMEN OF COLOR REPROD. 
HEALTH COLLECTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK (2007). 
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of social interests and forces at work that bear upon constitutional 
rights as “body politics” that exist beyond the narrow 
conceptualization of privacy.163 He uses the term body in its 
corporeal sense, as the actual harm wrought upon the physical 
bodies of individuals as a result of public and private harm, 
violence, and governmental complicity that is not captured by the 
traditional privacy framework.164 He argues that privacy’s narrow 
articulation fails to acknowledge or account for the public and 
private practices that affect access to constitutional rights. He 
describes that, “This constellation of prohibitive practices . . . 
enlists the unauthorized, unofficial, disciplinary powers of private 
actors and the authorized, official police power of state 
institutions . . . . Given this complexity, the question becomes 
whether the factual predicates of the issues presented in 
Hardwick can be cleanly or comprehensively contained within the 
constitutional category of privacy.”165 
Similarly, privacy in the context of medication abortion fails 
to account for the myriad of state and private forces that bear 
upon decision-making and autonomy in the realm of the home. 
For example, as described above, intimate partner violence may 
drive some pregnant people to medication abortion at home to 
avoid detection by abusive partners for ending a pregnancy. 
Pregnancy is a common flashpoint for intimate partner violence 
and abusers frequently restrict access to reproductive care and 
contraception to coerce and control their victims.166 In this 
context, the private violence of intimate partners would cast 
serious doubt as to whether a pregnant person has true access to 
either decisional autonomy or privacy in its traditional sense when 
considering whether medication abortion at home falls within 
privacy’s legal boundaries. As described in Professor Thomas’ 
work, it may be argued that private violence and state complicity 
in violence in the home through lack of enforcement form part of 
the body politic that influences decisional autonomy in the home, 
but is not recognized in the narrow conscripts of the right of 
 
 163. Thomas, supra note 9, at 1435–36; see also id. at 1461–62. Professor Thomas’ work 
considers the limits of the privacy analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, arguing that the privacy 
analysis fails to acknowledge the role that sodomy laws play in encouraging private 
homophobic violence and governmental complicity in violence toward the LGBTQ 
community. 
 164. Id. at 1436. 
 165. Id. at 1441 (emphasis added). 
 166. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
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privacy. Privacy fails to acknowledge the public aspect of abortion 
access and fails to address the necessity of a governmental 
commitment to the right. Instead, situating medication in the 
home in terms of a right of privacy fails to acknowledge the ways 
that economic, political, and social systems bear upon medication 
abortion in the home. 
In addition to intimate partner violence, the privacy analysis 
also fails to account for the ways in which public actors such as 
clinic protestors, and State policies that restrict access to clinics, 
require waiting periods and long travel, are integral to—or should 
be integral to—the privacy analysis. The doctor requirement 
restricts pregnant people’s access to care in the privacy and 
protection of their homes and forces them into a public setting of 
a clinic. In addition to the impact on the dignity and decisional 
autonomy of all pregnant people who are denied access to 
medication abortion at home, the doctor requirement subjects 
those who are most vulnerable to the potential of increased risk 
of private violence, public harassment and surveillance, and state 
surveillance and detention. Limiting the analysis to privacy of the 
home limits the analysis of the public and private implications of 
the doctor requirement. In short, the limited nature of the privacy 
analysis fails to acknowledge the public dimensions and the 
private harm of the doctor requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Medication abortion at-home falls squarely within zonal, 
relational, and decisional privacy. Common law privacy protects 
the home as a sanctuary of solitude and repose free of intrusions 
by third parties. Constitutional privacy law protects the home as 
a location free of governmental surveillance and intrusion. 
Further, the Court has recognized the right of privacy to 
encompass more than merely spatial privacy within the physical 
confines of the home. Rather, the Court has held that the privacy 
right encompasses deeply personal decisions related to marriage, 
child rearing, reproduction and intimacy of relationships. 
Medication abortion, both inside and outside of the clinical 
context, engages the right of pregnant persons to protections 
against third party and governmental surveillance within the 
privacy of the home as well as protection of pregnant people’s 
liberty and autonomy to exercise reproductive decision-making. 
In the context of medication abortion at home, the home 
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functions in the traditional way set forth in privacy jurisprudence, 
as a shield against state surveillance and as a location of solitude 
and repose, especially for marginalized communities. People 
living in poverty, in rural areas, of color, or with compromised 
immigration status may be more likely to turn to self-induction 
abortion outside of the formal healthcare system because of fears 
of immigration surveillance, structural barriers such as cost, 
distance of clinics, and waiting periods. The higher rate of 
abortion self-induction among these marginalized groups leaves 
them open to greater surveillance and therefore in greater need 
of the protection of the home as a shield against state and third 
party surveillance. 
More broadly, however, analyzing medication abortion 
within privacy law’s framework of zonal, decisional, and relational 
privacy highlights the limitations of the privacy analysis in this 
context. The Court’s conceptualization of an individualized 
privacy right, or what has been described as the “atomistic man,” 
fails to account for social, political, and economic forces that work 
in tandem to deprive pregnant people of meaningful privacy in 
the home. Much feminist scholarship has criticized privacy as a 
legal concept and questioned whether privacy is a right that is 
available to women. The doctor requirement suggests that privacy 
continues to be elusive and largely unavailable to pregnant 
people. Rather, while privacy case law has centered the home as 
a zone free from governmental intrusion, for pregnant people the 
home has become a site of increasing regulation in the benign 
guise of protecting women’s health. 
 
